Experts and local governments don’t share the vice president’s confidence. John Feeley, the former ambassador to Panama and principal deputy assistant secretary for the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, told TMD that while Venezuela serves as a transit point for cocaine originating from the Andes and Colombia, only “between 8 and 12 percent” of the cocaine sent from Venezuela makes its way to the U.S. In the complex supply chains for the American cocaine and fentanyl customer, Venezuela isn’t a major player.
The small boats seen being struck by missiles on videos posted to social media by Trump were also extremely unlikely to be making the roughly 1,500-mile voyage from Venezuela to the U.S. Motorboat transport comes after a plane flies drugs long distances to a drop-off point, Feeley noted. More likely, the “small boats in the Caribbean were heading to Venezuela and Trinidad,” he said.
In recent days, it’s been revealed that some of the victims of the U.S. attacks included individuals from Ecuador and Colombia. And, according to those countries’ governments, there’s no evidence they were involved in drug trafficking.
Andrés Fernando Tufiño is an Ecuadorian citizen who survived a U.S. attack on a semi-submersible traveling in the Caribbean. The U.S. Navy repatriated him, and upon his return to Ecuador, his government released him. The Ecuadorian attorney general’s office said that with “no report of a crime,” Tufiño could not be detained.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro has gone further. After Colombian media reported that a man killed during a U.S. strike in September, Alejandro Carranza, was a fisherman with no ties to the drug trade, Petro wrote on social media that “U.S. government officials have committed murder.” (Another Colombian national, who survived an attack, will be tried in Colombia for drug trafficking.) In response, Trump declared that he would halt all military aid to Colombia, mainly used for counternarcotics operations, and said that he would announce new tariffs on Colombia. He also called Petro an “illegal drug lord.”
But Mark Nevitt—an expert in national security law at Emory University’s School of Law—told TMD that focusing on whether those killed in the strikes were actually transporting drugs is dodging a key legal question. “In theory, a nonstate actor could conduct an armed attack against the United States,” requiring a military response, Nevitt said. However, Nevitt argued, other criteria matter, such as whether the group in question has an organized command structure, is engaged in sustained violence, and is targeting the U.S. government or people, matters. “Intent matters a whole lot,” Nevitt said.
With judges loath to insert themselves into questions of foreign policy, the only probable check on the executive would come from Congress. In theory, legal advisers from within the Army’s Judge Advocate Corps could offer their judgment, but Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has fired several top uniformed lawyers in recent weeks. The top U.S. military officer for Central and Southern America, Admiral Alvin Holsey, also abruptly announced last Thursday that he will resign by the end of the year, reportedly over disagreements around operations in the Caribbean.
But congressional Republicans, in control of both chambers, appear to have little appetite for asserting the legislature’s authority over war powers. One notable exception is Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky, who is currently moving to introduce legislation with Democratic Sens. Tim Kaine of Virginia and Adam Schiff of California that would explicitly prevent the U.S. from attacking Venezuela unless Congress gives permission.
“When you kill someone, you should know, if you’re not at war, not in a declared war, you really need to know someone’s name at least,” Paul said on Sunday. “You have to accuse them of something. You have to present evidence. So all of these people have been blown up without us knowing their name, without any evidence of a crime.”
The tools the Trump administration employed to pursue the Caribbean campaign against these vessels, legal or not, are far greater than what’s required for anti-drug-trafficking operations. A considerable military force has been assembled in the Caribbean, including the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, which can transport thousands of Marines along with helicopters and strike fighters, three U.S. missile destroyers, and various support craft. Alongside the naval assets, 10 F-35 fighter jets and at least three Reaper drones have been deployed to Puerto Rico; local photographers have also captured pictures of heavy gunships used to support ground troops.
“Obviously, it’s far more capability than you need to stop drug ships,” R. Evan Ellis, a professor at the U.S. Army War College who worked for former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Latin American issues, told TMD. In recent weeks, the White House has also signaled that it’s willing to go beyond strikes on suspected drug-smuggling boats: Trump said last week that the CIA has been cleared to pursue undercover activities in Venezuela, three B-52 heavy bombers flew near Venezuelan waters, and the president told reporters that the U.S. was “looking at” ground strikes.
Will Freeman, a research fellow for Latin America studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, told TMD that he believes the U.S. is “totally going to strike land” targets in Venezuela in the relatively near future, seeking to pressure military leaders to remove Venezuela’s dictator, Nicolás Maduro.
“There was a reluctance to commit to that risky use of military force,” during Trump’s first term, Ellis said, and significant numbers of troops were never deployed to the Caribbean. But Ellis argued that the White House has now assembled adequate forces and articulated a legal rationale (even if dubious) by designating drug smugglers as armed terrorist groups.
For a president seeking quick wins on the international stage, removing Maduro would settle a longstanding score. During his first term, Trump recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president and imposed sanctions on Maduro’s regime. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is also a longtime opponent of Maduro and Venezuela’s socialist dictatorship, stretching back to his days in the Senate. So, regime change could be on the table.
Venezuelan military leaders may not be susceptible to U.S. pressure, however. “If you’re going to dislodge a very well entrenched regime, you have to offer them a better alternative,” Fabrice Lehoucq, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, told TMD. The leader of the Venezuelan opposition, Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado, has spoken out against Venezuela’s military brass and favors a crackdown on drug smuggling.
The idea that the U.S. would be able to install a friendly leader by killing or removing Maduro while holding back from a ground invasion is the “smoking crack version” of plans for regime change, Feeley said. He pointed out that any new government would have to deal with regime loyalists, military elements, drug cartels, and Colombian guerrilla groups operating within the country. “But if you do commit boots on the ground,” he argued, “you now have an unpopular foreign war that the U.S. Congress has not voted for.”
The U.S. and Venezuela might be stuck in a staring contest. “The White House has to make a decision here, whether to escalate militarily and risk a leadership vacuum that could see Venezuela turn into a kind of Libya just a three-hour flight from Miami,” Geoff Ramsey, a senior nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, told TMD. Or, the White House could “just declare victory and move on.”
With tensions in the Caribbean steadily escalating, Trump may have to make a decision sooner than many expect. At least, that was the view of Sen. Kaine last week, speaking to the Washington Post. “The pace of the announcements, the authorization of covert activities and the military planning makes me think there’s some chance this could be imminent,” he said.
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