The Chinese Yoke: Russia’s Return to Vassalship

In the 13th century, Muscovy, the medieval antecedent to modern Russia, was a small outpost on the periphery of Kyivan Rus. It would not emerge as a regional power until the Mongol conquest, where it became crucial in extracting taxes for tribute and maintaining the overlordship of the Khans in the region. In turn, the Mongols supported Muscovy’s rulers in a symbiotic relationship. Today, a similar dynamic is taking shape as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime becomes structurally dependent on China — not only to sustain its war in Ukraine, but also to maintain basic stability. The salient question for analysts is: To what degree will Russian dependency on China continue after the war? I predict this dynamic will be centered on two competing forces: China will serve as the economic lifeline for Russia, with the latter expected to align within the former’s sphere of influence. At the same time, Russia will attempt to reduce this dependency by developing alternatives to China with success depending on its level of geopolitical isolation following the war.

The Architecture of Russian Dependence

Russia’s structural dependency developed throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War, with China serving as a buyer of hydrocarbons, a source of finished complex and technological goods, and a financial facilitator. By 2024, Russia imported 60 percent of new passenger cars and 65 percent of trucks from China even to the detriment of domestic producers who have reduced workweeks to four days. China serves as a major access point for Russia to the global economy by facilitating transshipments of goods it cannot yet effectively manufacture, including wood milling machines, ball bearings, static converters, and other industrial goods. Russian dependence also extends into its exports. China’s “teapot” refineries —privately owned small-scale refiners — specialize in refining sanctioned hydrocarbons from multiple countries. China, facilitated by pipelines, shadow fleets, cryptocurrency, yuan-based agreements, and barter trading, is able to purchase hydrocarbons well below market price. Considering it is one of the only buyers available, China is able to maintain and prolong Russia’s structural dependency. Smaller, already sanctioned Chinese banks assume the transaction burden so that larger banks can remain globally relevant. Meanwhile, long-term commitments such as expensive gas pipelines, years-long mineral contracts, and the integration of complex technologies further bind Russia’s economy to China’s.

Post War

Russia will seek to reduce its dependency on China even as it experiences several post-war challenges, and its subordination to China is not yet conclusive. Regardless of the war’s specific end, Russia will face economic recession, long-term demographic decline, an eventual political succession crisis, and some residual level of political-economic isolation that has yet to be determined. Post-war Russian policy must address maintaining regime control, regaining access to global markets, and reducing structural dependence on China. The priority, however, will be maintaining the ruling regime even at the cost of further subordination to China. Currently, the factions constituting the Russian regime are unified by the war. The security services and military (the siloviki) maintain preeminence, while the oligarchs and technocrats are expected to support the effort and — if not — may find themselves mysteriously falling out of windows of high-rise buildings. Without the pressures of war, the oligarchs and technocrats will seek to rebuild their position, and this will lead to factional competition which may weaken Russia’s capacity to resist Chinese influence. For example, depending on its willingness to subordinate another state, China might offer well-priced, high-end technologies to disrupt attempts to rebuild domestic industry or provide financing to stabilize the current regime at the cost of other factions’ influence. Russian subordination may also be constrained due to competing Chinese foreign policy objectives. While it certainly wants to avoid the reconstitution of a competing polarity in the anti-American order it must also maintain political buy-in within its sphere of influence and avoid resentment of other partners. After all, one of the appeals of a China-led order is its often-stated nominal commitment to not interfering in the internal affairs of other states.

Russia’s eventual succession crisis will likely exacerbate factional competition. It is a country with deliberately weak institutions intended to maximize the personal rule of Putin. Once this source of political gravity disappears, regardless of reason, a different force must fill the vacuum. China can prove itself indispensable in supporting a winner. If that happens, it will come at a cost, especially since a new political regime will require support to consolidate power, whether that be in the form of needing assistance to pay off supporters or suppress dissent. This plausible future crisis has historical echoes from the Mongol yoke where the Khan’s support was essential in securing political succession. Historically, such support often came with promises of increased tribute and other concessions which further weakened the state but improved the position of the ruler. Critical from China’s perspective will be not overexploiting its position to mitigate Russia’s desire for an alternate sponsor, and to maintain the stability of a Chinese-friendly regime even if it retains some autonomy. Following the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian regime will likely seek alternatives to China. Some of the initial countries may include Iran, Vietnam, and India due to previously existing economic relationships. Iran can serve as a technological collaborator as it has during the war while Vietnam and India serve as potential buyers of Russian gas and oil as well as weapons. Additionally, of critical importance will be Turkey, which enjoys a degree of geopolitical independence within NATO but still has access to Western markets and often balances between the West, China, and other powers. Turkey could serve as an alternate access point for global markets and another buyer of gas and oil. In return, Turkey could gain additional leverage with the United States and Europe because it can throttle its relationship with Russia up or down depending on the concessions it receives and its interests. Presently, Turkey has adopted a balancing position in the conflict and maintains ties with both the West and Russia. Turkey’s economic relationship with Russia will likely expand given its opportunistic yet balanced approach to international relations.

Finally, Russia will likely attempt to make inroads with NATO states starting with smaller states such as Hungary, with the eventual aim being Germany and other economic heavyweights. If this happens, Russia’s success will partially depend on the success of far-right political movements which are eager to improve their own economies via cheap economic inputs from Russia, with Germany’s Alternative for Germany and France’s National Rally at the forefront. Should the far-right fail at the ballot box, Russia will face relatively higher economic isolation, but Europe’s fragmented nature will mean increased ties with at least one or two states. These alternative economic relationships are not a given and will be influenced by any possible post-war sanctions regime, and other competing economic relationships such as Vietnam’s growing economic ties with the United States, partially in order to counter China. Meanwhile, certain aspects of China’s value proposition are not easily replaced, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, vehicles, and financial mechanisms. Therefore, Russia’s economic alternatives will be crucial in mitigating the breadth of Chinese dependence. But developing these alternatives will take time, encounter resistance, and involve addressing other competing concerns during which Russia may be forced to rely on China. The extent of Russia’s success in developing economic alternatives remains to be seen and will be crucial in reducing Chinese dependence.

Subordination Dynamics

The relationship between China and Russia following the war in Ukraine will fulfill several functions depending on the specific conclusion of the war and the stability of the Russian regime.

Tributary State

Russia will likely fulfill several key functions for China following the war — at least to some degree. Most notably, it will likely become a raw material provider. For China, this arrangement would ideally provide enough income for regime survival and cheap inputs for its manufacturing-reliant economy, while maintaining Russian dependence. Natural resources will be Russia’s economic mainstay since a population facing emigration, rapid aging, and the consequences of a large veteran population suffering from untreated post-traumatic stress disorder and physical wounds requiring extensive medical care does not lend to economic productivity. Further exacerbating its economic decline is a projected post-war recession, which many countries face as they transition back to a peacetime economy. The tributary state dynamic will largely be determined by Russia’s financial desperation in maintaining internal stability, the level of post-war economic sanctions, the reluctance of international companies to do business in Russia, and alternative economic partners. A medium-term consideration would be for Russia to develop alternative economic sectors, including further developing its arms industry, which can now draw from the experiences of modern war.

Security Buffer

Russia will likely have to maintain significant forces on its western border to consolidate control over any seized Ukrainian territory and maintain posturing against NATO. To respond, NATO countries and Ukraine would have to maintain their own forces to reduce the risk of conflict reigniting. The occasional Russian provocation or large-scale exercise will prove useful in further tying down NATO military capacity. This security orientation will help China occupy Western attention and resources between the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. The United States is then faced with the dilemma of allocating forces between several hot spots around the globe. Crucial to this new state of affairs will be Europe assuming a greater portion of the security burden on the continent. It will no longer be able to maintain low military spending levels as it did prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Increased military spending will place a greater financial burden on Europe’s electorate, which may become vulnerable to Russian influence.

Economic Enabler and Integrator

China possesses several unique economic advantages necessary to support Russia’s continued stability and already provides critical technological components for Russia’s military, internal security services, and consumer market. For example, Chinese semiconductors are crucial for Russian missile production and its vehicles flood the domestic Russian market. Adopting such technologies often means integrating supply chains and other systems that are not easily transitioned away from — even if an alternative is available. Other potential economic partners — such as Iran, India, and Vietnam — don’t easily provide technological replacements. Though some successes on the software front are notable, substituting imports via domestic production has not compensated for all technological needs. Therefore, Russia will likely be dependent on Chinese technology, at least in the short term due to the lack of viable alternatives. Chinese economic support could also extend into the financial sphere. Russia will face a degree of isolation from credit markets following the war given possible residual sanctions and reluctance to conduct business (given how some companies have had property expropriated during the war). China is less reluctant, with the yuan being used in 54 percent of all Russian stock market trades given Western sanctions and highlighting Russian dependence on China. China has previously been willing to serve as a lender of last resort to other financially isolated countries. Even though this trend has been declining, Russia will likely seek access to Chinese credit markets. Specific loan conditions could be tied to access to key infrastructure or collateralization via mineral revenues that give China additional control over key economic assets within Russia. It is likely Russia will have to rely (at least partially) on Chinese debt financing since it will experience some continued isolation in global credit markets, but it may find some financial diversity amongst the rich capitals of the Middle East or willing Western countries depending on the level of sanctions it faces after the war.

Possible Regime Guarantor

If the Putin regime or its successor is particularly unstable, China could serve as the guarantor providing economic, political, and possibly military support to maintain a friendly regime in Moscow if less intrusive methods fail. It may also serve as an arbitrator of last resort between factions or the actual sponsor of preferred factions. China would likely be reluctant to avoid overcommitting in such a scenario but would seek to maintain its economic access while contesting any U.S. or E.U. influence in the region.

Central Asia and the Loss of Spheres of Influence

Spheres of influence often require sufficient economic and military mass to maintain. Over time, Russia’s sphere of influence will narrow to perhaps include only Belarus, with even the Caucasus and Central Asia becoming a domain of competition between Russia, Turkey, and China. In 2025, China became the largest trading partner for Central Asia, eclipsing Russia. Although both countries trade in different sectors, this shows that Russia’s overwhelming position in the region has declined. Meanwhile, the Caucasus are taking advantage of Russian weakness to expand their multi-vector foreign policies and economic links. For example, Armenia has been forced to normalize relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, no longer confident in the Russian security umbrella. Azerbaijan is strengthening economic agreements with China in the hopes of expanding the “Middle Corridor,” which circumvents Russia and connects Central Asia and the Caucasus to both Europe and China. Now, Russia is no longer the essential trade intermediary it once was to facilitate trade in both regions. With the decline of Russia’s military and trade influence, Central Asia and the Caucasus become the true victors of the Russo-Ukrainian War as they gain alternatives to Moscow.

The Dangers of a “Reverse Nixon” Strategy

This bleak future may tempt some to consider a “reverse Nixon” strategy, where the United States and Europe deepen ties with Russia and rush to a peace deal to fracture the Sino-Russian axis before it can solidify. The key problem is that this policy is unviable unless a suitable regime comes to rule Russia with converging interests. To support the Putin regime’s survival or a like-minded successor is to support renewed hybrid warfare in the United States and Europe following Russia’s eventual recovery while still having to contend with a Russian-Chinese axis. Historically, this was the case when examining Russia’s foreign policy between 2014 and 2022. During this period, Russia was less dependent on China. Even then, it maintained a hostile, hybrid warfare policy towards the West and provided little balance against China. Currently, Russia hopes to exploit the desire for a quick peace in Ukraine, knowing the West is politically weary from the war and will be reluctant to respond to provocations or outright aggression.

Russia will further internalize the United States and NATO as its main geopolitical opponent given the traumatic, albeit self-inflicted, psychological impact the war has had on the nation’s psyche

The siloviki will exploit their hostile stance against the American order, since this will justify continued extensive control over Russian society gained since 2022. Though the oligarchs and technocrats will likely push for expanded Western ties, their influence is already diminished. The “reverse Nixon” strategy is unviable not because it is not logical when considering state interests, but because regime interests do not align. Russia will likely encourage pursuit of the “reverse Nixon” strategy because it provides negotiating leverage for better terms with Beijing. This may give Western analysts false hope that such a policy is viable, but minor concessions between Russia and the United States should not be seen as a paradigm shift within the Kremlin’s calculus.

Others argue that a “reverse Nixon” strategy could be viable under a different Russian leader, who need not be democratic but merely interested in maintaining autonomy from China. Rapprochement could be reconsidered later, but if done too early or with the wrong regime, would only provide another lifeline to recover and continue a hostile policy towards NATO countries. Instead, while Putin is in power, NATO should maintain Russia’s isolation to degrade the reconstitution of its national power via sanctions, support to Ukraine, and a strong eastern flank. NATO should avoid rebuilding a hostile regime’s position, even if it means increased short-term Chinese dependence, because the alternative will not see Russia balancing against China regardless. In the end, the current regime in Russia will respect strength and political unity over any agreements on paper. Crucial to this is ensuring that continental European NATO members are capable and possess the political will to deter Russian provocations or outright aggression. The door to the West should remain cracked open with deeper ties remaining contingent on meaningful security reforms. The original Nixonian policy of separating China from the Soviet Union was performed in a different geopolitical context where relations between the two countries were already degraded by territorial and political disputes, with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger capitalizing on existing disputes. Such a time has not yet come.

A New Muscovy?

Centuries ago, Muscovy’s princes sent tribute to the Mongol Khans. Now, a modern dependency architecture reappears not in the form of tribute caravans carrying precious metals, rugs, and furs, but discounted hydrocarbons, mining rights, long-term land leases, and — in the most extreme possibilities — potential land transfers. Russia’s structural subordination will enter its consolidation phase following the war in Ukraine. Its political-economic weakness, isolation, and the regime’s survival prioritized over geopolitical independence will become further catalysts for dependence. Russia will seek economic and technological alternatives to China where possible, but its ability to scale these links means alternatives will be limited for some time. A “reverse Nixon” policy risks empowering a regime that is already within the Chinese orbit.

Matthew Zalewski, Ph.D., specializes in the history of security in Central and Eastern Europe. He is a foreign area officer in the U.S. military.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

Image: kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons