The first phase of the U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas is a tremendous achievement, securing the release of hostages held by Hamas for over two years and the end to a devastating war in Gaza in a 20-point plan. But the second phase of the plan will confront a set of thorny issues, including the disarmament of Hamas and the future of Palestinian governance. If past is precedent, Hamas will fight tooth and nail to preserve its political and military standing in Gaza and its commitment to violently oppose prospects for peace.
This is not the first time Hamas has had its back to the wall and had to engage in a strategic reassessment, finding a way to navigate international pressure while preserving its commitment to using violence to undermine its Palestinian rivals and, ultimately, destroy Israel. Thirty-one years ago, Hamas found itself in a difficult position in the wake of the Oslo accords, which began the long “peace process” between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Then, as now, Hamas faced the prospect of an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and a Palestinian governance structure that excluded the group and was committed to its disarmament. The decisions it made at the time offer a preview of how it is likely to operate in the weeks and months to come.
As it did in the 1990s, Hamas will nod in agreement to the various cease-fire requirements but will also seek to continue functioning as a political actor in Gaza. It will recruit new leaders and fighters from recently released prisoners and Gazans frustrated by the slow pace of aid and reconstruction, rearm its cadres with weapons smuggled by Iran or manufactured at home, and refill its empty coffers by co-opting humanitarian aid or resources intended for reconstruction. Put simply, Hamas may play along with the first phase of the cease-fire. But the group is not done fighting.
A Helping Hand
Three weeks after the White House signing ceremony of the Oslo accords in 1993, 17 people from across North America, described by the FBI as “senior leaders of Hamas,” convened at a Philadelphia airport hotel to strategize a way forward for the group. Recognizing that conditions were not ripe for openly supporting militancy, participants decided to be careful not to affiliate themselves with Hamas to avoid bad publicity and law enforcement attention. To that end, and unaware they were already under FBI surveillance, they decided to refer only to “Sister Samah,” spelling Hamas backward.
Despite this attempt at concealment, the Hamas leaders at the meeting expressly committed themselves to “supporting the holy struggle, jihad.” But this required weapons, which participants worried would be in short supply with the prospect of peace on the horizon and a Palestinian population eager to enjoy the benefits of self-governance. The new Palestinian Authority was also committing to security cooperation with its Israeli counterparts, which Hamas feared would complicate their ability to secure weapons. “How are you going to do it? How are you going to perform jihad?” one Philadelphia meeting participant asked his colleagues.
The answer, Hamas concluded over time, was to establish a close relationship with Iran, a process in which the U.S.-based members of the group played an important role. According to the Palestinian politician Ziad Abu-Amr, by 1994, Iran was “provid[ing] logistical support to Hamas and military training to its members.” Abu-Amr estimates that, at that point, Iran had provided tens of millions of dollars to the group. Tehran also trained Hamas operatives to carry out attacks targeting Israel. In 1996, Hassan Salamah, the Hamas commander behind a string of Hamas suicide bus bombings that year, told Israeli police that after undergoing ideological indoctrination in Sudan, he had been sent to Syria and eventually Iran, where he received more specialized training in constructing and planting explosives, as well as in intelligence collection.
Today, Iran is likely to once again try to help Hamas pivot. According to Israeli officials I spoke with last month, Iran has already put in motion a plan to resupply Hamas with weapons, stockpiling them in Sudan for future smuggling into Gaza. Meanwhile, Tehran has continued efforts to smuggle weapons to terrorists in the West Bank, including Hamas. Just days before the cease-fire, Israeli security forces foiled a large Iranian weapons smuggling attempt, which included Claymore mines, drones, and antitank rockets; other weapons shipments were intercepted in March and November 2024.
Live To Fight Another Day
Iran, however, is weaker than at any point in the past three decades, thanks to the crushing defeat it experienced in a 12-day war with Israel earlier this year, along with various economic and environmental crises facing the regime. Meanwhile, Iran’s premier proxy, Hezbollah, agreed to a cease-fire with Israel after suffering a year of debilitating Israeli strikes. One reason Hamas accepted the cease-fire deal was the realization that it was largely left to fight Israel on its own. Iran’s “ring of fire” surrounding Israel has fizzled out.
A nearly identical version of what became the current cease-fire deal has been on the table for months. But it came together in early October because all sides faced intense pressure in the wake of the Israeli strike on Hamas senior leadership in Doha. Shocked by the attack, Gulf states led a group of Arab and Muslim countries to press U.S. President Donald Trump to push for an immediate deal, meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to develop what coalesced into Trump’s 20-point plan.
The Doha strike drove home Arab states’ concerns about the spillover effects of the Gaza war, and granted Trump, who according to numerous media accounts was angered by the Israeli strike, the impetus to push Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in ways he was previously unwilling to do. Hamas’s few remaining regional interlocutors—Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt—all put unprecedented pressure on Hamas, threatening to cut diplomatic cover, deport Hamas leadership, and oppose any Hamas role in postwar Gaza.
Even before the Doha strike, pressures on Hamas had been steadily building. Gazans were increasingly angry with Hamas over the impact of the war it had started, and several Gazan clans and militias had begun to violently oppose Hamas, some with Israeli support. Time was not on the group’s side: with every passing day, Hamas risked losing leverage as fewer hostages remained alive. In the past two years, Hamas has lost thousands of fighters and many commanders and leaders, and regional media have reported that the majority of its new recruits are untrained youths with limited fighting skills. Running low on weapons and funds as well, Hamas leaders likely worried that it could lose further political standing in Gaza.
This is not the first time Hamas has had its back to the wall.
Although Hamas leaders originally intended to reject the Trump cease-fire plan, they ultimately accepted the deal, with caveats. They will now pivot to positioning themselves within Gaza’s postwar governance structure and to rebuilding the group’s ability to violently prevent any other actor from becoming the dominant power. Hamas has already deployed its fighters to positions from which the Israeli military has withdrawn, dressing them mostly in civilian clothing, rebranding them as “Gaza Security Forces,” and seeking to assert control and settle scores with clans and tribes that have opposed the group. Meanwhile, the leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza issued a joint statement expressing their “absolute rejection of any foreign guardianship” in Gaza, despite the Trump plan’s express provision for a temporary international stabilization force to train and support vetted Palestinian police in Gaza.
The 20-point plan stipulates that Hamas and other militant factions will not have any role governing Gaza, but Hamas still wants to be part of whatever technocratic Palestinian body next administers Gaza. As I’ve argued before in Foreign Affairs, Hamas did not carry out the October 7 attacks in order to wind up governing Gaza, but with the goal of being able to operate more like Hezbollah does in Lebanon: to be both part of and apart from the Palestinian political structure by participating in the political system but not running it, all while maintaining an independent fighting force unrestrained by the burden of governance. Trump’s plan expressly rules that out, insisting that Hamas and other militant factions play no role in the future governance of Palestinian territories; that Hamas and other militant groups be fully disarmed and weapons decommissioned; and that regional partners “ensure that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.” Hamas, for its part, will do whatever it takes to avoid being sidelined in this way.
Disarmed And Dangerous
Trump is already anticipating “everlasting peace” throughout the region, but Israeli authorities have a different vision in mind. Recalling that the Hamas leader and October 7 mastermind Yahya Sinwar was among the 1,027 prisoners Israel released in 2011 in exchange for an Israeli soldier, Israeli leaders fear that the current exchange of hostages for prisoners may lead to the release of the next Sinwar. They worry Hamas will regroup under a new generation of leaders who, like Sinwar, became further radicalized (but also more strategically astute) in Israeli prisons.
The Trump plan calls for the disarmament of Hamas and other militant groups and the demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, but not all stakeholders are on the same page. According to the head of Egypt’s State Information Service, Diaa Rashwan, what Hamas agreed to do is only to freeze its weapons, not to disarm. It remains unclear whether American, Egyptian, and Qatari mediators accepted this Hamas variation from the Trump plan. The Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk rejected the idea of disarmament, stating that the group would not disarm and insisting that “resistance is a legitimate right of the Palestinian people.” For Israel’s part, Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has already conditioned full withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip under phase two of the cease-fire deal on addressing Hamas’s weapons, reiterating that Hamas must disarm.
Hamas remains committed to “actively solicit contributions and fundraising,” another legacy of its 1993 Philadelphia decisions. International organizations should be expected to foot the bill for most Palestinian needs, they argued, allowing Hamas to concentrate fundraising efforts “on those directly connected with jihad.” In retrospect, Hamas achieved this goal in spades, focusing its funds on providing for its supporters, building grassroots support, and underwriting its militant activities.
But today, Hamas faces an acute financial crisis after two years of war and the loss of its previously lucrative ability to derive revenue from taxes and fees it collected as the de facto governing authority in Gaza. Under the cease-fire, desperately needed humanitarian aid is due to surge into Gaza, which of course is a very positive development. But it is also true that Hamas has an established track record of diverting aid and taxing local merchants, as noted by Gazans who have watched this happen. One reason Hamas agreed to the cease-fire now is that it was so short on funds. It believes that it will be better positioned to replenish its empty accounts in the post-cease-fire period.
The Hard Part
Anticipating the U.S. designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization, which took place in 1995, one participant at the 1993 Philadelphia meeting told his colleagues, “I swear by Allah that war is deception.” It is necessary to “camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy.” The Americanized Hamas supporters compared the idea to a basketball player’s head fake: “He makes a player believe that he is doing this while he does something else.” That is the best way to understand Hamas’s acceptance of the cease-fire. While it slowly and carefully rearms in Gaza, the group will continue to plot attacks from the West Bank, Lebanon, and potentially against targets abroad as well; several Hamas plots were recently thwarted in Europe.
And even if mediators successfully navigate all 20 points of the Gaza peace plan, the region will still be far from Trump’s vision of everlasting peace. There will be spoilers on all sides, of course. But none will be as effective as Hamas and Iran and its proxies.
An impressive collection of world leaders met in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, hours after Israeli hostages were released. The leaders of Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States issued a communiqué expressing their shared “determination to dismantle extremism and radicalization in all its forms.” But that commitment will mean little if some meat is not quickly put on the bones of the skeletal 20-point plan. The key to undermining Hamas’s ability to regroup is to quickly put other security and governance structures in place to replace those run by Hamas.
For starters, the Sharm al-Sheikh summit participants must stand up a temporary international stabilization mission to replace the Hamas forces that immediately moved in following the Israeli military’s withdrawal. Next, they must train and support a newly vetted Palestinian police force. Finally, they should quickly establish a temporary, transitional body of technocrats to oversee the massive undertaking of reconstructing and governing postwar Gaza.
Without these additional security and governance structures, Gaza will be left with what now exists on the ground: namely, Hamas-run security forces and government ministries. But it doesn’t have to be this way. By constructing these alternatives, the governments that helped forge the cease-fire can also help disarm and disempower Hamas.
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